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good news is that the introduction of either type of primaries acts as a stabilizing force since equilibria exist
quite generally, serves as an arena for policy debates since all candidates propose differentiated platforms, and
guarantees that each party’s nominee is of higher quality than its primary opponent. Moreover, primaries tend
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1 Introduction
Party primaries have become an increasingly common method of nominating candidates for a general election.
In the US, since just after WWII, primaries are by and large conducted in the same manner as a general election
and run by the same electoral authorities. In Europe and Latin America, primary elections are a more recent
phenomenon, and primaries are generally run by the parties themselves. Several questions of interest naturally
arise. For example, how does the introduction of primaries influence candidates’ policy proposals? How does
the introduction of primaries affect the outcome of the general election? If we allow candidates to vary both in
policy positions and on a valence or quality dimension, how does the differentiation of candidates in the party
primary on these two dimensions affect the party’s performance in the general election? Also, how does the
choice between a closed and an open primary type matter?
We answer such questions in the framework of a standard Downsian model of electoral competition by
considering plurality two-party competition in a two-stage election (primary and general) where candidates
choose and commit to a given platform prior to the primary election.1 Wefirst assume that both parties run closed
primaries with two candidates competing in each primary. At the time of closed primaries, parties are treated
as exogenous and differ in the preferences of their primary electorates. Candidates may differ both in policy
platforms and in terms of a commonly valued and commonly known non-policy characteristic, which we may
label a valence or quality dimension. By introducing this quality heterogeneity among candidates, voters who
1Standard assumptions of a Downsian model are office-motivated candidates, full commitment, and sincere voting among others.
See Grofman (2004); Osborne (1993) for a list of assumptions that are generally perceived to best justify the description of a model
as a Downsian one.
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participate in the primaries and in the general election sincerely vote not only on the basis of policy proposals, but
also on the basis of which candidate is considered to be “better” (for example, in terms of charisma, corruption
allegations and experience).2 Regarding candidates’ behavior, we present all our formal results by positing that
all candidates aim at maximizing their general election vote share in the absence of any kind of uncertainty.3
In our setup, we characterize the unique equilibrium of the game with several interesting properties arising.
In equilibrium, each party’s low valence candidate proposes a platform coinciding with the ideal policy of her
party’s median. Each party’s high valence candidate is relatively more moderate than the low valence primary
candidate and, targeting at the best electoral outcome in the general election, locates the closest possible to
the society’s median. The valence asymmetry between the two primary candidates ultimately determines how
differentiated the two platforms are. The larger the advantage of one candidate is, the more she is capable of
moving towards moderate policies and hence becoming more appealing in the general election while guarantee-
ing a primary victory. As far as valence is concerned, since high valence candidates always win their primary,
our result is in line with recent empirical evidence showing that primaries tend to be effective at selecting high
quality types (Hirano and Snyder, 2014). In terms of policy proposals, primaries serve as the arena for mean-
ingful intra-party policy debates since primary candidates propose differentiated platforms. Nevertheless, the
2While in the general election there are no incentives for strategic voting, this is not the case in the primary. We discuss the effect of
introducing a small share of strategic voters in the online appendix, and we argue that the main qualitative features of our equilibrium
analysis are robust to such extension.
3Our results however are to some extent compatible with the alternative interpretation of candidates having some uncertainty
regarding the location of the median voter in the general election when choosing their primary platforms so as to maximize the
probability of winning the general election.
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intensity of such debates is crucial in determining the winner of the general election and primaries can prove
harmful to the party with the highest valence candidate. Our results show that the low valence general election
candidate may win if she faced a weak party primary opponent, while the highest valence candidate could not
propose a moderate enough platform because of tight primaries inside the losing party. Hence, our divergent
equilibrium result shows that primaries may prove harmful to a party if they create too much competition dur-
ing the nomination process. This within-party competition effect of primaries on electoral outcomes, is the first
substantial result of our analysis and relates to the negative aspect of the divisive effect of primaries (Key, 1953;
Agranov, 2016).
Second, our analysis suggests that primaries have amatching effect: candidates nominated by leftist (rightist)
parties win more often when the society’s median is leftist (rightist). This is a result of primaries making
candidates more responsive to the policy preferences of their primary electorate rather than the general one.
If for example the society becomes more leftist, the leftist party will win more often than before, since the
high valence primary candidate of the rightist party cannot react to the median’s shift. If the rightist high
valence candidate were to propose leftist policies that would please the new median, this would potentially
make her lose the primary. Notice that this otherwise intuitive feature of our equilibrium is, surprisingly, absent
from most electoral competition models without primaries: models with office-motivated candidates usually
generate equilibria in which candidates converge (either in deterministic or in probabilistic terms) and models
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with policy-motivated candidates often predict that candidates will locate equidistantly away from the society’s
median -and will hence tie- independently of whether the society’s median is leftist or rightist (see, for example,
Osborne and Slivinski 1996; Besley and Coate 1997; Ortuño-Ortín 1997; Saporiti 2014; Matakos et al. 2016).
Overall, the matching effect may further strengthen the stability of the party system as it allows parties to form
a more durable ideological framework. However, the asymmetry of party competition, with the party whose
median voter is closer to the overall median being advantaged, allows us to recognize an important stylized
fact about much political competition, namely that there may be (extended) periods during which one party is
dominant (Merrill et al., 2008).
Third, the introduction of primaries in this intuitive setup extends our knowledge on equilibrium existence
in modifications of the standard Downsian model. While without primaries a pure strategy Nash equilibrium
in a similar two-party setup does not exist (Aragonès and Palfrey, 2002),4 we show that with closed primaries a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies always exists, and this is true for any distribution of voters’ preferences.
That is, while the standard Downsian model of electoral competition with valence asymmetries predicts that
stability may (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000) or may not be reached (Aragonès and Palfrey, 2002), the intro-
duction of primaries provides a clear stabilizing effect.5
4To be precise, Aragonès and Palfrey (2002) consider that the two heterogeneous candidates are win-motivated and hold imperfect
information regarding voters’ policy preferences. As it is argued in Aragonès and Xefteris (2017a), in these models, win-motivation
with imperfect information about voters’ preferences is technically equivalent to vote-share maximization and perfect information
about voters’ preferences. Equilibrium existence with win-motivation and perfect information about voters preferences equilibrium
existence is rarely an issue (see, for instance, Ansolabehere and Snyder 2000).
5The search for stabilizing forces in multidimensional competition models has attracted previous attention and several proposals.
Among others, Lin et al. (1999) consider probabilistic voting, Krasa and Polborn (2012); Dziubiński and Roy (2011); Aragonès and
Xefteris (2017b) allow for differentiated candidates and Bräuninger (2007) for costly voting.
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To the best of our knowledge, this is the first paper to point at these three effects of primaries simultane-
ously. The second and the third effect are obviously positive ones: primaries stabilize the electoral process and
generate consistency between the party of the elected candidate and voters’ policy preferences, and these in
turn promote a sense of trust in the political system. The first effect, has, arguably, negative implications: a
high valence candidate that faces hard within-party competition might end up losing the general election to a
mediocre candidate that won in her party’s primaries against a low quality opponent.
We propose several modifications to our analysis and find that our results are robust in a number of direc-
tions. First, we focus on open primaries. Once all candidates make their policy proposals, active citizens who
are willing to participate in the procedure vote in the primary of the party in which their top-ranked candidate
participates. This implies that by proposing moderate platforms, candidates not only increase their general elec-
tion vote share, but also increase the amount of active voters participating in their party’s primary. Hence, both
parties’ size as well as the ideal policy of the parties’ medians are now endogenously determined and depend on
the quality characteristics of all candidates. That is, in contrast to closed primaries where candidates gain nom-
ination by focusing only on their party’s median voter and the quality characteristics of their party’s candidates,
in open primaries attention is also paid to the quality characteristics of the other party given the endogenous
sorting of voters across primaries. Interestingly, and despite the endogenous party formation described, the
stabilizing effect of primaries prevails since for a large class of voters’ distributions we still obtain a unique
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equilibrium in pure strategies such that: a) in some instances, the highest valence candidate does not emerge as
the winner of the general election (within-party competition effect of primaries) and b) the winner of the leftist
(rightist) primary is more likely to be the general election’s winner when the society’s median is leftist (rightist)
(matching effect of primaries).
Finally, we investigate situations where a primary is held only in one of the two parties (either closed or
open). This is of interest since incumbents often run for reelection without going through a nomination process
and face a challenger who emerged from a primary. In ourmodel, we assume that the position of the incumbent is
fixed and that primary candidates in the opposition strategically choose their platforms (typically the incumbent
has less flexibility than the challenger in credibly promising something different to the implemented policies).
We find that when the incumbent implements socially detrimental (appealing) policies, the highest valence
challenger is elected less (more) often under closed primaries than under open primaries. The reason why bad
incumbents are less threatened by challengers that emerge from closed primaries than from open primaries, is
that closed primaries hold candidates close to their party’s median, who might be quite far from the society’s
one. Open primaries pose no such restriction and allow candidates to expand their primary electorate by moving
towards the center. In other words, open primaries give incentives to high valence candidates of initially less
moderate parties to move towards the center and, thus, to: a) win more often and, perhaps more importantly, b)
make their parties more moderate by moving towards the centre and hence attracting new moderate voters for
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their primaries. These results point to an interesting effect of the organization of the party in opposition on the
incumbent’s decisions when the latter cares about reelection: incumbents have stronger incentives to implement
moderate policies when the challenger’s party holds open primaries than when it holds closed primaries.
Our paper complements the existing literature on primaries with valence asymmetries by adding several
insightful new results.6 Ourwork closely relates toAdams andMerrill (2008) since, to the best of our knowledge,
this is the only other setup where all four primary candidates may differ in valence. Nevertheless, while Adams
and Merrill (2008) focus on a probabilistic voting model we focus on a deterministic one.7 As is well known,
probabilistic and deterministic voting models with valence asymmetries deliver very diverse predictions on
candidates’ equilibrium behavior and as we show this is also true in the context of primaries.8 The presence
of a random element eventually leads to primary candidates proposing identical platforms, while the point of
convergence might differ across parties (Adams and Merrill, 2008). On the contrary, we show that primary
candidates run on different platforms giving back to primaries the element of an internal battlefield.
Hummel (2013) also employs a non probabilistic valence model, but, unlike us, he considers that: a) the
6Research on primaries without valence issues was presented among others in Owen and Grofman (2006); Meirowitz (2005);
Coleman (1971); Aranson and Ordeshook (1972). For papers interested in the non commitment of primary winners and flip flopping
between primary and general elections see Hummel (2010); Agranov (2016). For the effect of sequential primaries on electoral
competition see Callander (2007); Deltas et al. (2016). For work on different ways of candidates’ nomination including primaries see
among others Crutzen et al. (2010); Jackson et al. (2007); Winer et al. (2014); Hortala-Vallve and Mueller (2015); Kselman (2015);
Amorós et al. (2016); Buisseret and Van Weelden (2017).
7In a probabilistic voting model one votes for a certain candidate with a probability that is increasing in the utility that one derives
from the election of this candidate. That is, one need not vote for the top-ranked candidate, although this is one’s most probable action.
In a deterministic voting model one always votes for the candidate offering the highest utility.
8For example, in standard two party competition models, while probabilistic voting models do not rule out convergent equilibria
when valence asymmetries are not very large (see, for example, Schofield 2007), this never occurs in deterministic voting models (see,
for example, Aragonès and Palfrey 2002).
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higher (lower) valence candidate of the leftist party has precisely the same valence with the higher (lower) va-
lence of the rightist party and b) voters may strategically decide not to support their top-ranked candidates.
Similar to Hummel (2013) we show that high valence candidates propose more moderate policies than low va-
lence ones. Nevertheless, by allowing all four candidates to differ in valence, we provide new results on the
effect of primaries on the winner of the general election and demonstrate why and when the highest valence
candidate may not win the general election. Takayama (2014) uses similar assumptions to those of Hummel
(2013) and models primaries only in the challenger’s party with overall three candidates of different valence.
She shows that as the incumbent’s valence increases, the qualifying challenger becomes more moderate. Our
results under the presence of an incumbent are different and depend on the primary type. We show that if the
party runs closed primaries, the policy proposed by the high valence challenger is not affected by the incum-
bent’s characteristics. On the contrary, when the party organizes an open primary, the challenger becomes more
moderate as the incumbent’s valence decreases.
In Kartik and McAfee (2007), as in Hummel (2013), there are two levels of valence but different to the
aforementioned papers high valence types are committed to an exogenous platform. In Serra (2011); Snyder
and Ting (2011) both primaries and the general election function as a valence revelation mechanism and their
focus is more on the adoption or not of primaries rather than on primary candidates’ platforms proposals. In
Andreottola (2016) only primaries serve as a valence revelation mechanism and in contrast to us his results show
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that the high valence primary candidate proposes more extreme platforms than the low valence candidate. For
models of primary elections with endogenous valence see Serra (2010); Casas (2013).
The remainder is structured as follows: In Section 2 we present the model, in Section 3 we present our
results for closed, open and one party primaries and in Section 4 we conclude. In the Online Appendix we
discuss possible extensions and justifications of some of our main modeling elements and we present all the
proofs.
2 The Model
The policy space is the [0, 1] interval. We have a unit mass of general-election voters whose ideal policies
are distributed according to an absolutely continuous, strictly increasing and twice differentiable distribution
function Φ : [0, 1] → [0, 1] with a unique median, m ∈ (0, 1), defined by Φ(m) = 1
2
. Two positive measure
subsets of these voters form the two exogenously given parties and participate in a closed primary election
where no other voters can participate. Let the median of the leftist party be the primary voter with ideal policy
l and the median of the rightist party be the primary voter with ideal policy r with all l, r and m known and
0 < l < m < r < 1.9 Candidates A and B compete in the primary of the leftist party and candidates C and
D compete in the primary of the rightist party. Each candidate J ∈ {A,B,C,D} is characterized by a valence
parameter vJ ≥ 0 and strategically chooses and commits to an electoral platform xJ ∈ SJ , where SJ = [0,m]
if J ∈ {A,B} and SJ = [m, 1] if J ∈ {C,D}. We assume that vB > vA, vC > vD and vB > vC . This ordering
9Notice that we impose very little structure on the precise kind of closed primaries that each party holds. While for example one
party may run a (primary) election where only “core” party members are eligible, another party may run a primary open to all party
members.
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of valences assumes that B and C are the high valence candidates in each of the parties, places the highest
valence candidateB in the leftist party, and provides equilibrium locations in order with candidates’ “names”.10
We focus on the interesting case when valence differences are not very large (the exact formal constraints are
presented in the statements of our propositions).11
The game has three stages. In stage one, all four candidates choose and announce their policy platforms
simultaneously. In stage two, closed primary elections take place in each of the two parties.12 In stage three,
the general election takes place and each voter votes for one of the two primaries’ winners. All ties, either in
primaries or in the general election are broken with equiprobable draws.
The utility of a voter with ideal policy i ∈ [0, 1] when candidate J ∈ {A,B,C,D} is elected in office (or
else, wins in the general election) is given by
ui(xJ , vJ) = −|i− xJ |+ vJ
in line with literature on electoral competition among candidates of unequal valence (see for example, Grose-
close 2001; Aragonès and Palfrey 2002). Voters are sincere both in primaries and in the general election and
vote for the candidate that offers them the highest utility. We assume that when some voters are indifferent
among a number of candidates, they evenly split among them.
10One can show that our equilibrium results hold when allowing one or more equalities but at a considerable cost in the proof length.
11Indeed, most of the literature focuses in characterizing equilibria for this scenario (e.g. Groseclose 2001; Aragonès and Palfrey
2002) as when valence differences are very large electoral competition might become trivial.
12Our analysis would carry through if closed primaries in each party took place sequentially.
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Since voters’ behavior in stages two and three is essentially mechanic, one may define the expected vote
share of candidate J in the general election as
PJ(xJ , x−J : v,Φ, l, r)
where x−J is the vector of platforms of the other candidates and v = (vA, vB, vC , vD). Candidates are Downsian,
that is, they maximize expected vote shares in the general election. The equilibrium concept we employ is
Nash equilibrium in pure strategies, that in this setup is a vector xˆ = (xˆA, xˆB, xˆC , xˆD) such that for every
J ∈ {A,B,C,D} it is true that PJ(xˆJ , xˆ−J : v,Φ, l, r) ≥ PJ(x´J , xˆ−J : v,Φ, l, r) for any x´J ∈ SJ .13
3 Results
Before presenting our main results, let us define two concepts of crucial relevance. In equilibrium each primary
is won by the high valence candidate (B wins the leftist primary and C wins the rightist primary). We refer to
the valence difference in the general election as the “toughness” faced by B (defined as TG = −(vB − vC)).
Similarly, we refer to the valence difference in each party as the “toughness” candidates B and C face in their
primary elections respectively (defined as TL = −(vB − vA) and TR = −(vC − vD)). Notice that given our
restrictions on candidates’ valence characteristics, “toughness” takes negative values, approaching zero when
both candidates are of almost equal valence representing the “toughest” of all cases.
13Maximization of the general election vote share is one of the possibilities when introducing office motives and since we focus
on pure strategies, it is a refinement of the following ordered pair of objectives: a) a candidate prefers all outcomes of the game in
which she is the winner of the general election to any other outcome and b) among all outcomes in which a candidate does not win the
general election, this candidate prefers the outcomes in which she wins her party’s primaries. Recall also the alternative interpretation
of our model hinted in Footnote 3 according to which Φ may be viewed as the candidates’ beliefs regarding the location of m and
candidates’ objective as maximizing the probability of winning the election (we elaborate on this in the online appendix).
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Proposition 1 If valence differences are not very large, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is such
that in each party: a) the low valence candidate proposes the platform preferred by the party’s median voter,
b) the high valence candidate proposes a more moderate platform than the one preferred by the party’s median
voter, and c) the high valence candidate (i.e., B in the leftist party and C in the rightist one) wins the primary.
Formally, if l < m − vB < m + vB < r then there exists a unique Nash equilibrium xˆ and is such that
xˆA = l, xˆB = l − TL, xˆC = r + TR and xˆD = r.
All proofs can be found in the online appendix
The existence of a unique Nash equilibrium points at the stabilizing effect of primaries on electoral com-
petition. That is, while in the absence of primaries a clear prediction is hard to be derived –either the model
does not admit an equilibrium in pure strategies (Aragonès and Palfrey, 2002) or it admits a continuum of equi-
libria (Ansolabehere and Snyder, 2000)–, this is no longer true when the two candidates have been selected
through a primary race. Moreover, valence asymmetries in primaries create interesting electoral dynamics and
in equilibrium lead to the divergence of proposed platforms in the primary race (in line with Hummel 2013
and in contrast to Adams and Merrill 2008) with general election candidates locating somewhere between their
parties’ and the general election median (a platform ordering supported in the literature (Coleman, 1971; Aran-
son and Ordeshook, 1972; Burden, 2001; Adams et al., 2005)). In specific, the low valence candidate locates
exactly at the party’s median, while the high valence candidate is more moderate and locates closer to the so-
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ciety’s median.14 How far towards the society’s median the high valence candidate is able to move depends on
the “toughness” of the primary. The higher the valence asymmetry inside a party, the more the winning candi-
date can converge towards the society’s median, thus improving her future performance in the general election.
On the contrary, if both candidates are of almost equal valence, then the high valence candidate is not able to
differentiate much and this may have a negative impact in her performance in the general election. In the char-
acterized equilibrium, in each primary, all more extreme party members than the party’s median are indifferent
between the two candidates and therefore split between the two primary candidates. All more moderate party
members than the party’s median however strictly prefer the high valence over the low valence one and vote
for her. Hence, the high valence candidate wins the primary for sure obtaining the support of three quarters of
party members. Regarding the winner of the general election, the following Corollary indicates that any of the
qualifying candidates may win.
Corollary 1 Candidate B’s prospects in the general election are benefitting from a moderate leftist party (i.e.,
high l), an extreme rightist party (i.e., high r), a leftist median voter (i.e., low m), and a “tough” primary in
the rightist party (i.e. high TR), while harmed by a “tough” leftist primary and general election (i.e., high TL
and TG). The reverse holds for candidate C. Formally, candidate B wins the general election if TG + TL <
14Recall that candidates in the leftist (rightist) party are constrained to propose platforms to the left (right) of the median. Parties
howevermay impose different constraints on candidates’ platforms (e.g., through a prerequisite of aminimumnumber of party officials’
endorsements and/or resolutions of party summits regarding the party’s flexibility on certain policy issues). Fortunately, all the
arguments supporting the existence of the equilibrium, xˆ = (l, l + vB − vA, r − vC + vD, r), continue to hold for all alternative
strategy sets {S˜A, S˜B , S˜C , S˜D}, as long as xˆJ ∈ S˜J for each J ∈ {A,B,C,D}. That is, as long as the constraints on candidates’
platforms set by the party, allow a candidate to locate sufficiently close to the party’s median, our equilibrium continues to exist (even
in the extreme case in which parties do not constrain candidates at all). Of course the uniqueness arguments that we develop may not
extend to all conceivable alternative strategy sets.
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l + r − 2m + TR, candidate C wins the general election if TG + TL > l + r − 2m + TR and each of B and C
win with equal probability if TG + TL = l + r − 2m + TR.
The winner of the general election ultimately depends on parties’ and the society’s medians as well as the va-
lence asymmetries determining the “toughness” of both primaries and the general election. We further explain
our results focusing on the winning prospects of the highest valence candidate B with symmetric arguments
holding for the prospects of candidate C. Our results indicate that B wins the general election when the aggre-
gate toughness she faces in the primary and general election is low “enough” (i.e., TG+TL < l+ r−2m+TR).
This condition illustrates that B is favoured by a moderate leftist party (large l), an extreme rightist party (large
r), and a tough primary in the rightist party (large TR). This condition also points at the matching effect of
primaries since the leftist party wins more often as the society becomes more leftist (i.e., smallm). On the con-
trary,B’s election prospects are harmed by a tough general election (large TG) since voters compare the valence
characteristics of the two general election candidates and B loses more often as her advantage compared to C
gets smaller. Finally, a tough primary (large TL) is also harmful for B since the presence of an almost equally
competent primary opponent obliges her to remain close to the party median so as to guarantee nomination thus
harming her general election performance (within-party competition effect). This last effect also points to the
fact that parties may not benefit when choosing both their primary candidates from a pool of highly competent
members and some heterogeneity proves desirable. Ideally, when the time of primaries arrives, parties would
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opt for a competition between their most competent member and a low valence internal opponent so as to have
good chances in the general election.
3.1 Open primaries
Having obtained a very general result for closed primaries a natural question is what occurs when parties hold
open primaries. Open primaries are an increasingly popular method used by several parties to select their
nominees.15 We therefore extend our setup allowing voters to decide in which primary to participate once all
four candidates announce their platforms.16
For the analysis of open primaries some further assumptions are necessary. While again, candidates A and
B constitute the candidates of the leftist party and candidates C and D constitute the candidates of the rightist
party, we assume that only a subset of voters are “active” and participate in the primaries. Let active voters
have ideal policies distributed according to any continuous log-concave distribution F with a unique median
ma.17 These “active” voters participate in the primary of the party where the candidate that gives them the
highest utility is competing and vote for that candidate. Hence, the distribution of active voters across parties
and therefore the location of the primary median voters are endogenously determined and depend on candidates’
15In the US around one third of the states hold an open primary. In Europe the socialist parties of France, Greece and Italy run
open primaries for their leaders as it is the case for the conservatives in the UK for some parliamentary candidates. The European
Green Party ran a paneuropean open primary for the 2014 EU election. In Latin America open primaries take place in Argentina. For
mixed empirical evidence on the effect of primaries on political competition see Kaufmann et al. (2003); Gerber and Morton (1998);
Kanthak and Morton (2011).
16Our open primaries model has a similar spirit with the literature modeling endogenous parties (e.g., Eguia 2011a,b, 2012;
Gomberg et al. 2016, 2004; Baron 1993).
17We consider that a continuous distribution function F is log-concave if ∂
2 lnF (x)
∂x2 < 0 and
∂2 ln[1−F (x)]
∂x2 < 0 for every x ∈ (0, 1).
That is, the notion of log-concavity that we employ implies thatF is strictly increasing and twice differentiable in its support too. While
log-concavity of the distribution of voters’ ideal policies is a general assumption and widely used in the political economy literature,
our definition is weaker compared to the “standard” one assuming a log-concave density function (see Bagnoli and Bergstrom (2005)
for further properties of log-concave distributions).
17
policy proposals and valence characteristics. As far as candidates are concerned, we assume that each candidate
J ∈ {A,B,C,D} strategically chooses and commits to an electoral platform xJ ∈ SJ , where SJ = [0,ma] if
J ∈ {A,B} and SJ = [ma, 1] if J ∈ {C,D} while valence differences are again not very large. Finally, if no
voters participate in one of the two primaries (i.e., when all active voters prefer the candidate(s) of one party
compared to those of the other) we assume that each of the candidates qualifies to the general election with
equal probability. The following Proposition characterizes the equilibrium:
Proposition 2 If valence differences are not very large, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is such
that parties and their medians are uniquely defined and in each party: a) the low valence candidate proposes
the platform preferred by the party’s median voter, b) the high valence candidate proposes a more moderate
platform than the one preferred by the party’s median voter, and c) the high valence candidate (i.e., B in the
leftist party and C in the rightist one) wins the primary. Formally, for every F there exists v˜B > 0 such that
for every vB ∈ (0, v˜B): a) the endogenous party medians (l∗, r∗) ∈ (0, 1)2 are the unique values that solve










there exists a unique Nash equilibrium xˆ and is such that xˆA = l∗, xˆB = l∗ − TL, xˆC = r∗ + TR and xˆD = r∗.
The equilibrium structure is similar to the one in closed primaries with primary losers locating on parties’
medians and primary winners diverging from the party median towards the median of the society. What is
different compared to closed primaries is that now party medians (i.e., l∗ and r∗) are endogenously determined
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and depend on all four values of valence characteristics (see Example 1) as well as the distribution of active
voters. Again, candidates B and C propose the two most moderate platforms but now the indifferent voter
between the two determines not only their vote shares in the general election but also the distribution of active
voters across the two primaries. Since active voters decide to participate in the primary where they can identify
the candidate that gives them the highest utility, all active voters on the left (right) of the indifferent voter in the
general election participate in the primary of the leftist (rightist) party.
Notice that an equilibrium exists and is unique, guaranteeing the stabilizing effect of primaries even if voters
can freely choose in which primary to participate. Unlike, though, the case of closed primaries in which the
fixed party structure guarantees equilibrium existence for any distribution of voters, in open primaries existence
is obtained by some mild restriction on such distribution (F being log-concave).18 All these suggest, that indeed
the stabilizing effect of primaries holds even with open primaries for a very general class of preference profiles,
but, as expected, it is weaker compared to the closed primaries case. We note though that the fact that open
primaries might stabilize electoral competition for such a general class of preference profiles, is more surprising,
at least to us, than the fact that they are less prone to lead to stability compared to closed primaries. At first
sight, one could expect that the dynamics that lead to the existence of an equilibrium when primary electorates
are fixed, would disappear once we considered that parties are endogenous.
18This restriction is necessary because an equilibrium may not exist when F is too convex around the location of the indifferent




2 . If for example F is log-convex about this point (where the notion of
log-convexity is symmetric to the one of log-concavity), a slight transition of B from her equilibrium platform l∗ + vB − vA to
l∗ + vB − vA + ε, brings in the leftist primary many new supporters of B. Hence, B still wins in the primary and improves her
performance in the general election.
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As in closed primaries and Corollary 1, any of the two general election candidates may win the election and
the condition such that one or the other candidate wins is similar. The highest valence candidate B wins the
general election as long as the aggregate “toughness” she faces is lower than a given threshold (i.e., TG + TL <
l∗ + r∗ − 2m + TR). Such threshold now clearly depends on the endogenous location of the primary median
voters (i.e., l∗ and r∗). Candidate B benefits if the endogenously formed leftist party is relatively moderate
while the endogenously formed rightist party is relatively extreme. Similar to closed primaries, the highest
valence candidateB is harmed if the primaries in the leftist party are much tougher in terms of valence than the
ones of the rightist party (within-party competition effect). Moreover, the matching effect of primaries where
the leftist candidate benefits from a leftist electorate is still present since candidate B wins more often as the
society becomes more leftist (i.e., smallm).19
Remember that the main difference between open and closed primaries is that while in closed primaries
candidates propose platforms that depend exclusively on the exogenous location of the party’s median voter
and the valence characteristics of the party’s candidates (Proposition 1), in open primaries proposed platforms
depend on the endogenous location of the party’s median voter and therefore the valence characteristics of all
four candidates (Proposition 2). That is, in open primaries valence characteristics in each party also affect
19To see that this is not an artefact of having distinct primary and general election electorates, let for example Φ = F = 2−a+ax2 x,
where a ∈ [−2, 2]. This is a simple class of distributions with linear densities where a = −2 corresponds to the triangular dis-
tribution with a peak at zero, a = 0 corresponds to the uniform distribution as in Example 1, and a = 2 corresponds to the trian-
gular distribution with a peak at one. One can show that the matching effect is strongly present: when the society is left leaning
the nominee of the leftist party enjoys an electoral advantage and vice versa. Formally, when most voters are leftist (a < 0 or









2 ) ∈ ( 12 ,m).
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nomination in the other party, a feature absent in closed primaries. The following example illustrates such
interaction in open primaries.
Example 1 From Proposition 2 we know that parties’ median voters (l∗, r∗) are the unique values that solve










voters be uniformly distributed (i.e., F (x) = x). Then these two equations simplify to
2l∗ =
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Solving these two equations with respect to l∗ and r∗ we identify the location of the primary median voter in






































vA + vB − vC + 1
2
vD.
As this example shows, all equilibrium platforms depend on all valence characteristics and illustrate forces
that push parties to the extremes or the centre. Ceteris paribus, an increase in the valence of either B or D
move platforms to the right. On the contrary, an increase in the valence of either A or C move platforms to
the left. That is, as a nominee’s valence increases (i.e., B’s or C’s), not only she moves to moderate grounds
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but also makes the other party propose extreme platforms. On the contrary, an increase in the valence of a
losing primary contender’s (i.e., A’s or D’s) not only ties the whole party to the extremes, but also permits the
opposing party to propose moderate platforms.
Given the discussed differences in platform proposals across primary types, one may wonder which primary
type delivers higher social welfare (defined as the sum of individual utilities). Our analysis indicates that in the
most symmetric scenario (Φ(x) = F (x) symmetric about 1/2, and F (l) = 1−F (r) = 1/4) the society is better
off when parties hold open primaries. This is true because while in this symmetric case the winner (and hence
her valence) is not affected by the primary type, the winner’s platform is closer to the median’s preferred policy
when primaries are open.20 Of course, since l and r need not coincide with the first and third quartile of the
active voters’ distribution in the open primary, one can think of cases where closed primaries are better for the
society: these would involve exclusion of extreme voters from the open primary (i.e., l and r are close to ma).
When extremist voter participation in closed primaries is significant though (this is most often the case), open
primaries seem to better serve the centrists’ voters interests as they allow the potential winner to move closer to
their preferences.
20Given that voters’ utilities are linear in policy and the winner’s valence is not affected by the primary type, the primary type
that delivers higher welfare is the one that brings the winner’s platform closer to the median’s preferred policy. To see why in this
symmetric scenario the winner is not affected by the primary type one can refer to Example 1 (i.e., F uniform and hence l = 1/4 and
r = 3/4) while also assuming that the general electorate is uniformly distributed. Computing candidates’ vote shares it turns out that
under both open and closed primaries B wins the election if TG + TL < TR (i.e., B faces relatively less aggregate toughness than
C does). Now comparing the winner’s proposed platform in open primaries (Example 1, xˆB = 14 − 32vA + 2vB − vC + 12vD) or in
closed primaries (Proposition 1, xˆB = 14 + vB − vA), indeed, the one proposed in open primaries is more moderate also whenever
TG + TL < TR. Therefore, while the winner is not affected by the primary type, indeed open primaries deliver higher welfare than
closed ones.
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3.2 One party primaries
In reality not both parties need to hold a primary before the general election. A typical situation of interest for
the absence of primaries in one party is when an incumbent runs for reelection. Let the incumbent be candidate
C with valence vC and an ideal policy xC that is known and fixed.21 The leftist candidates A and B may run
in a closed or open primary and while we still assume that vB > vA we do not require that vB > vC permitting
the incumbent to be the highest valence candidate. As when both parties hold a primary, we assume that each
candidate J ∈ {A,B} strategically chooses and commits to an electoral platform xJ ∈ SJ (where SJ = [0,m]
in closed primaries and SJ = [0,ma] in open primaries) and a Nash equilibrium in pure strategies is a vector
xˆ = (xˆA, xˆB) such that none of the two candidates has incentives to deviate. Let us start by presenting the
results when the leftist party runs a closed primary.
Proposition 3 If the leftist party runs a closed primary to challenge an incumbent and valence differences are
not very large, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is such that in the challenger’s party: a) the low
valence candidate proposes the platform preferred by the party’s median voter, b) the high valence candidate
proposes a more moderate platform than the one preferred by the party’s median voter, and c) the high valence
candidate (i.e., B) wins the primary. Formally, if m + max{vB, vC} < xC then there exists a unique Nash
equilibrium xˆ and is such that xˆA = l and xˆB = l − TL.
Proposition 3 suggests that when the incumbent is challenged by a party organizing a closed primary, both
21Formally, let xC > m > l for the case of closed primaries and xC > ma for the case of open primaries.
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primary candidates follow the same strategies as when both parties hold closed primaries (i.e., xˆA = l and
xˆB = l − TL). Notice that only the “toughness” of the primary race -and not the incumbent’s characteristics-
determines how more moderate is the high valence candidate compared to the low valence one and the party’s
median. Of course the incumbent’s characteristics play a crucial role in determining the winner of the general
election. The following corollary summarizes how.
Corollary 2 Candidate B’s prospects in the general election are benefitting from a moderate leftist party (i.e.,
high l), an extreme incumbent (i.e., high xC), and a leftist median voter (i.e., lowm), while harmed by a “tough”
leftist primary and general election (i.e., high TL and TG). The reverse holds for candidate C. Formally,
candidate B wins the general election if TG + TL < l + xC − 2m, candidate C wins the general election if
TG + TL > l + xC − 2m and each of B and C with equal probability if TG + TL = l + xC − 2m.
As Corollary 2 indicates, whether the leftist challenger succeeds in replacing the incumbent depends on the
ideology of the leftist median, the ideal policy of the incumbent, as well as the “toughness” of the primary and
of the general election in terms of valence. The aggregate “toughness” condition such that the challenger B
wins (i.e., TG +TL < l+xC−2m) implies that the incumbent is of course harmed by her own extreme policies
and low quality. Additionally, the challenger increases her chances to successfully replace the incumbent when
she emerges from a moderate leftist party with non-competitive primaries, and when the median voter in the
general election is leftist.
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Notice that in closed primaries candidates aim at winning nomination focus only on their party’s median.
This explains why the challenger’s proposed platform is not affected by the incumbent’s platform. As we de-
scribe in the following proposition this is no longer true when the party in opposition holds an open primary.
Let as before F denote the distribution of active voters. The natural way of extending sincere voting in this
one-party primary scenario is to let active voters who like the most either candidate A or B participate in the
primary of the leftist party supporting their favorite candidate, while active voters that like the most the incum-
bent do not participate in the primary. Again, if none of the active voters participate in the leftist primary we
assume that A and B qualify to the general election with equal probability.
Proposition 4 If the leftist party runs an open primary to challenge an incumbent and valence differences are
not very large, there exists a unique Nash equilibrium and it is such that the challenger’s party and its median
are uniquely defined and: a) the low valence candidate proposes the platform preferred by the party’s median
voter, b) the high valence candidate proposes a more moderate platform than the one preferred by the party’s
median voter, and c) the high valence candidate (i.e., B) wins the primary. Formally, for every F there exists
vmax > 0 such that for every max{vB, vC} ∈ (0, vmax): a) the endogenous party median l∗ ∈ (0,ma) is the




), and b) there exists a unique Nash equilibrium xˆ
and is such that xˆA = l∗, xˆB = l∗ − TL.
Proposition 4 presents a similar equilibrium structure as Proposition 3 with l∗ denoting the location of the
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median of the endogenously formed leftist party. The condition providing such location permits us interesting
insights on the effect of the incumbents’ characteristics (i.e., xC and vC) on the platforms proposed in the
leftist primary and participation in the latter. As it turns out, the leftist party tends to be “large” and hence
more moderate when the incumbent implements extreme policies or is of low valence (formally l∗ is strictly
increasing in xC and strictly decreasing in vC). Similarly, the leftist party tends to propose moderate platforms
whenB is of high valence andA is of low valence (formally l∗ is strictly increasing in vB and strictly decreasing
in vA).22 The aggregate “toughness” threshold condition such that the winning leftist candidate B also wins the
general election follows the above intuition and is similar to when party B runs a closed primary and Corollary
2 (i.e., candidate B wins the general election if TG + TL < l∗ + xC − 2m).
The following example illustrates equilibrium proposals for the leftist candidates when primary voters are
uniformly distributed.
Example 2 Let “active” voters be uniformly distributed across the policy space. If the leftist party runs an open




(given that F is the uniform distribution). That is, l∗ = 1
3
(xC − vA + 2vB− vC). As Proposition 4 indicates, the
low valence candidate A proposes platform xˆA = 13(xC − vA + 2vB − vC), while the high valence candidate B
is more moderate by a distance vB − vA and equilibrium platform xˆB = 13(xC − 4vA + 5vB − vC).
In contrast to closed primaries, all platforms depend on the valence characteristics of all candidates in-




2 ), the log-concavity of F suffices to obtain the aforemen-
tioned comparative statics of l∗ with respect to all valence characteristics.
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cluding those of the incumbent as well as the implemented policy with xˆA and xˆB increasing in xC and vB and
decreasing in vA and vC as commented before. If we also assume that the society is uniformly distributed (i.e.,
ideologies’ of the general electorate are evenly distributed across then policy space or formally statedΦ(x) = x)









(2vB − vA + xC − vC)
Let us now go back to closed primaries. From Proposition 3, we know the proposed platforms are given by
xˆA = l and xˆB = l + vB − vA. When the society is uniformly distributed the location of the indifferent voter
and hence B’s vote share under a closed primary is given by:





Notice now that the location of the indifferent voter in the general election varies across the two primary types,
and hence the selection of one system over the other clearly affects the electoral outcome and possibly the winner
of the election. Comparing the location of the indifferent voter, we know that the vote share of the challenger’s
party is larger under an open primary rather than under an open primary if and only if
2
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This last condition can be simplified in a more intuitive manner as TL + TG < xC − 3l. Simply put, this
condition is equivalent to l∗ > l meaning that if the challenger were to run an open primary then the endogenous
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median would be more moderate than the party’s median voter if it were to run a closed primary.
Open or Closed primary in the challenger’s party?
An interesting question then is, when would the party in opposition increase its vote share by running an
open rather than a closed primary? The relevant condition (TL+TG < xC−3l) obtained in Example 2 indicates
that this occurs when the aggregate toughness the leftist candidate B faces is low enough.23 This may hold, if
for example candidateB is a candidate of sufficiently high valence. Hence, one would expect that parties where
a highly competent primary candidate competes may prefer open over closed primaries. This is because open
primaries permit the highly competent candidate to “open” the party to the society and propose more moderate
platforms than if she were to fight for nomination in a closed primary. In a similar spirit, the condition such
that open primaries are preferred over closed ones is also more likely to hold when party members participating
in the closed primary are relatively extreme (i.e., low l). This occurs because while under closed primaries
the candidates would have to please an extreme primary electorate, open primaries permit them to move to a
moderate ground and enrich the primary electorate with some moderate voters. Finally, parties in opposition are
more likely to select their nominee through an open primary when the incumbent is implementing a relatively
extreme policy (i.e., high xC). In that instance, given that the implemented policies let many voters alienated,
the opposition has incentives to open the primary to the society bringing in the party relatively moderate voters
23Remember that TL = −(vB − vA) denotes the “toughness” in the leftist primary (with vA < vB). Large values of TL denote a
very competitive primary that does not allow the primary winning candidateB moderate enough and become attractive in the general
electorate. The “toughness” of the general election TG = −(vB − vC) also has a similar effect with larger values of TG being
detrimental for the leftist candidate. Note here that while TL < 0 is still true, for the general election we have that TG < 0 if vC < vB
and TG > 0 if vC > vB .
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that push the endogenously formed median of the party to a moderate policy ground.
Our example so far has illustrated how the challenger’s vote share is higher under closed or open primaries
depending on the aggregate toughness the leftist candidateB faces. The following table summarizes the winner
of the election under all relevant scenarios and illustrates that the choice of primary type may actually determine
the winner of the election and a wrong choice may prove detrimental for the challenger’s party.





Very Low B B B
Moderately Low B C B
Moderately High C C B
Very High C C C
Table 1: Winner of the general election for open and closed primaries depending upon the challenger’s party
being extreme (l < 0.25) or moderate (l > 0.25) when the general electorate and active voters are uniformly
distributed.
If the aggregate “toughness” B faces (TL + TG) is very low, the challenger always wins.24 On the contrary,
if the aggregate “toughness” is very high, the incumbent always remains in office. Nevertheless, for moderate
levels of toughness the type of primary is crucial. Consider for instance that the leftist party is relatively extreme
(i.e., l < 0.25) and that the aggregate toughness is moderately low. If the challenger emerges through a closed
primary the incumbent remains in office, while if the challenger emerges from an open primary the incumbent
is successfully replaced. The reason why the wrong choice of primary type may be detrimental is that under
24Formally, for l < 0.25 aggregate toughness is very low if TL + TG < xC − 1 + l, moderately low if xC − 1 + l < TL + TG <
xC−0.75, moderately high if xC−0.75 < TL+TG < xC−3l and very high ifTL+TG > xC−3l. For l > 0.25 aggregate toughness is
very low ifTL+TG < xC−3l, moderately low ifxC−3l < TL+TG < xC−0.75, moderately high ifxC−0.75 < TL+TG < xC−1+l
and very high if TL + TG > xC − 1 + l.
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a closed primary B is not able to propose moderate platforms since the party’s median voter is quite to the
left (l < 0.25) and a moderate platform would result in a lost closed primary. However, recall that aggregate
toughness is moderately low (e.g., because B is quite talented) a fact that can be exploited by B under open
primaries. As it turns out, open primaries permit B to move away from l by “opening” the party to the society
and bringing the whole party to a moderate ground that eventually provides a victory in the general election.
For similar reasons, a moderate leftist party facing moderately high aggregate toughness should not opt for an
open primary but rather prefer a closed one given the moderate location of its median voter. To the degree that
all parameters of interest (vA, vB, vC , l and xC) are measurable, the above table summarizes the empirically
testable predictions of our model when a challenger aims at replacing an incumbent. Our results overall imply
that the strategic choice of primary type by parties’ leaders is of crucial importance since it may shape the
nominee’s success. In any case, parties seem to benefit by flexibility in their rule and should choose the latter
on a case by case basis taking into consideration the characteristics of all candidates (those of the incumbent
and the potential primary candidates).
3.3 When the two parties use different types of primaries
When both parties hold primaries, we have so far focused on situations where both parties hold the same primary
type. Given that we have previously established how open and closed primaries differ when a challenger emerg-
ing from primaries faces an incumbent, a natural followup question is what occurs when one party holds a closed
primary and the other holds an open primary. Our results permit us to discuss such situation. Let SA denote
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the set of all active voters participating in primaries, with a subset of them SC being eligible to participate in
the closed primary. In the sincere setup we have been focusing, three natural cases emerge regarding how party
members SC behave with respect to the open primary. Party members eligible to vote in the closed primary still
vote in a sincere manner and: a) participate only in the closed primary, b) participate in both primaries, or c)
participate only in the one primary where they identify their preferred candidate.
If voters eligible to vote in the closed primary vote only in this primary, the situation is identical to the one
we have described under the presence of an incumbent. In the closed primary, the low valence candidate will be
locating at the party’s median and the high valence candidate will be running on a more moderate platform. In
the open primary, the two candidates will be focusing on the distribution of the remaining active voters (SA\SC)
and propose platforms as if they were facing an incumbent (i.e., the high valence candidate winning the closed
primary). Hence, all intuition is as previously presented.
If voters eligible to vote in the closed primary are permitted to participate also in the open primary and do
so, candidates in the closed primary will be behaving exactly as before, focusing only on the party’s median
and the “toughness” of the closed primary. Candidates in the open primary will be running in an open primary
as if they were facing an incumbent but now they will be focusing on the median of the whole set of voters
(SA). Hence, while the closed primary voters (SC) participating only in the closed primary affect the open
primary exclusively through the location of their winning candidate, voting in both primaries also affects the
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open primary through the distribution of voters participating in the open primary.
Finally, if party members eligible to vote in the closed primary vote only in the primary with the candidate
they prefer, the situation is similar to both parties running an open primary. The difference is that while can-
didates running in open primaries will be focusing on all active voters (SA), candidates running in the closed
primary will be focusing only on a subset of them (SC).
4 Conclusion
Neo-Downsian modeling has generated a huge literature, with the initial simplifying assumptions of Downs’
classic model of two party plurality competition over a single policy dimension enriched with more realistic
assumptions, including multidimensionality, party primaries (varying from open to closed), and valence as a
basis for voter choice, as well as extensions to multiparty competition under electoral rules other than first past
the post. Here we have contributed to that tradition by seeking to develop a model of primary competition for
plurality two-party elections that matches various stylized facts about the real world, including perhaps most
notably a prediction of party differentiation in the general election, and allowing for a party whose support
base is closer to the position of the overall median voter to be advantaged, rather than assuming that electoral
competition leads to tweedledum-tweedledee politics with each party having an equal probability of victory.
We have also allowed for differences across primary type and for different results when there is or is not an
incumbent. Moreover, from a theoretical perspective, the equilibrium results we have complement the more
common non-equilibrium results in multidimensional two-party competition.
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We recognize that while we have made advances over previous models of party competition that include
both primaries and valence, ours is far from the last word. In particular, models of candidate behavior, our own
included, tend to focus on the perspective of a single candidate, and impute to that candidate office seeking
and/or policy seeking goals. There are two important ways –each of which takes us into areas beyond the
scope of the present article– in which that perspective could be modified in future work. First, we might add to
prospective candidate’s utility function a further consideration, namely their perception of the consequences of
their candidacy on the success of their party in the general election. Second, we could move from the specifics
of individual contests to ask about how political parties and interest groups affect the nomination process.
The conflict between what candidates want and what is in the overall interest of their party is especially
sharp when it comes to legislative redistricting (Owen and Grofman, 1988). Looking at how this conflict is
resolved in that domain gives us some ideas about how we might, in the future, model primary elections in a
general equilibrium framework recognizing that individual election contests are embedded in a wider institu-
tional setting. In the redistricting context, incumbents and challengers realize that the value of gaining office
is enhanced if their party is the majority party. This may make incumbents more willing to “take a hit for the
party”, that is, accept some loss of certainty about their own re-election in return for increased chances of their
party controlling the legislature. Of course, since a fundamental principle of politics is that no incumbent ever
regards his district as safe enough, willingness to take a hit for the party may be limited. Relatedly, in the primary
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context, candidates for office may have an exaggerated sense of their own valence and thus, be unwilling to posit
that their nomination in the primary will result in a loss for the party in the general election (cf. Uhlaner and
Grofman 1986). Moreover, they may not be sophisticated enough to consider that their candidacy may affect
the policies proposed by a competing primary contender in a way harming the party’s general election chances
even when it is that candidate who wins the primary and not themselves. Thus, while it certainly makes sense
to allow for the possibility of candidates caring about overall consequences for their party in modeling platform
choices, relying on this kind of altruism to deter primary challengers that can hurt the party in unintended ways
may be unrealistic, especially once we take misperceptions into account.
But there is a second route bywhich conflicts between party interest and the interests of individual candidates
get resolved, and that involves considerations of relative power. In the redistricting example, tradeoffs between
overall party interests and candidate/office holder interests is largely resolved by the relative power of incumbents
to control the process as opposed to that of other officials, such as governors, who might take a wider party-
centric perspective. In the primary context, to really understand the dynamics of candidates’ competition, we
would need to move beyond our stylized framework and look behind the scenes at the recruitment of candidates
(by parties and interest groups) and the nature of campaign support that primary candidates might expect to
receive from the party (e.g., access to list of party donors) and from particular interest groups. In particular,
there is universal consensus that “Money is the mother’s milk of politics”, as attested by both Democratic liberals
34
such as the late Jesse Unruh of California, and contemporary Republican conservatives such as Rush Limbaugh.
Thus, as candidates make their strategic decisions, they may be deterred to seek nomination by recognition of
the fact that sources of monetary support are already committed to other candidates. The dynamics of party
competition we described above show that, even though a primary challenger loses the primary, the mere fact of
her candidacy may affect the ability of the party to win the general election, because of the impact the challenge
has on the policy position taken by the candidate who does win the primary. However, even if individual
candidates may have non-aligned interests with their party, actors such as party officials and interest groups with
a longer term and strategic perspective may make decisions about who to support in the light of sophisticated
calculations, seeking to deter challengers who might harm the party’s general election chances and, if that fails,
seeking to reinforce the primary chances of the preferred candidate.
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Throughout our formal discourse we have interpreted Φ as the distribution of general-election voters, and we
have assumed that candidates have perfect information about it and choose their platforms so as to maximize
their general election vote share. As we have noted in the Introduction, this setup is equivalent to one where
candidates know the location of their parties’ medians but face uncertainty regarding the distribution of the
general electorate and choose platforms that maximize their probability of winning the general election.1 Notice
that this alternative interpretation is often reasonable since candidates may sometimes care just about winning
rather than their total vote share, while the fact that candidates have better information about the preferences of
their party’s median compared to the eventual location of the median in the general election can be also justified.
Indeed, there is often a long period between the primaries and the general election and, hence, assuming that at
the time candidates choose their platforms they have more accurate expectations regarding the behavior of the
electorate in primaries than in the general election seems reasonable. Keeping in mind the above interpretation,
throughout this section we discuss some of our assumptions and possible relaxations of those that would not
affect the substantial implications of our analysis.
1.1 Explaining losers’ entry
In our model, there are two candidates –the low valence leftist candidate and the low valence rightist candidate–
that get zero payoffs. Hence one could argue that their presence in the electoral race is not justified since they
cannot ever qualify to the general election and enjoy a positive vote share: why should one declare candidacy
if this does not improve one’s payoffs? Indeed, these concerns are valid, but, fortunately, they can be easily
addressed in our setup by assuming that candidates in each party represent different constituencies or ideological
factions and are thus not indifferent to the implemented policies. This modification is largely in line with real
world politics where parties are differentiated and hence attract different kinds of members, donors, activists, etc.
That is, representation of heterogeneous constituencies or, simply, policy motivation, is not only an additional
reasonable assumption, but fundamentally linked with the dynamic evolution of the party system when parties’
nominees propose clearly distinct political platforms. Below we explain in detail, but without unnecessary
1Φ then describes candidates’ beliefs about the median voter’s ideal policy. Given the one and a half dimensional nature of our
preferences (Groseclose, 2007), candidates’ maximize their payoff by maximizing the probability that they are the median voter’s top
choice (when indifferent, a voter is assumed to break the tie with equiprobable draws).
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formalities, how such secondary policy concerns may be integrated in the model and why they justify the entry
of low valence primary candidates.
In specific, if we consider that candidates objectives are lexicographically ordered2 –first, they care about
winning and, then, about the implemented policy– and that the valence differences are sufficiently small, then our
equilibrium, both in the closed and in the open primaries’ case, is still an equilibrium even if in the beginning
candidates were free to strategically decide whether they wish to be candidates or not. Obviously, the high
valence candidates would still like to run because this gives them positive election probability, which is their
primary goal. Let us hence focus on trying to understand the entry-related incentives of a low valence candidate
–say the one of the leftist party– when she expects that all other candidates will enter. This low valence candidate
knows that if she does not enter, the high valence candidate of her party will locate as right as possible (to better
achieve her win related objectives) and, independently of where the candidates of the rightist party locate, will
induce an expected policy outcome substantially to the right of m or mα (for the closed and open primaries
setup respectively). On the other hand, if this low valence candidate declares candidacy, she knows that the
high valence candidate of her party will have to declare a policy close to the median of their primary electorate
in order to qualify to the general election, and this will induce an expected implemented policy close tom (mα).
Hence, low valence candidates have good reasons to enter the race and crucially affect the electoral outcomes,
even if winning is not a serious prospect for them. Importantly, strategic candidacy is not a trivial issue (see
Dutta et al. 2001 for an excellent reference), and it is arguably very fortunate that our primaries’ setup can
provide clear intuition in support of candidates’ entry choices.
1.2 Strategic voters
Throughout our analysis we have considered that voters behave sincerely, in the sense that when encountered
with a pair of candidates they always vote for the one they like best (taking in account both the candidates’
policy proposals and their valences). Despite the fact, though, that this assumption captures the voting behavior
of many individuals (Pons and Tricaud, 2017), it is fair to claim that a subset of voters might vote using different
criteria. Indeed, while in the general election sincere voting is the only reasonable assumption since there are
2This is not necessary but greatly simplifies the involved arguments. One could consider instead that the candidates weight these
two goals and care substantially more about winning, and end up with similar conclusions, but with a significant additional analytical
cost.
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only two candidates, things are more complicated in the primaries. It is possible that a voter might prefer one of
the two primary candidates strictly to the other, but would rather see her least preferred candidate qualifying to
the general election, since this might offer her a higher expected utility. Consider, for instance, that we are in the
closed primaries framework, that xA = l, xB = l + vB − vA + ε for some ε > 0 and that the candidates of the
rightist party occupy their equilibrium positions (and hence candidateC is expected to qualify to the the general
election). Notice that a primary voter i of the leftist party with ideal policy xi < l strictly prefers candidate A
to candidate B, but, if ε is sufficiently small, she strictly prefers the lottery where B qualifies to compete in the
general election against C
Φ(
xB + vB + xC − vC
2
)(−|xB − xi|+ vB) + [1− Φ(xB + vB + xC − vC
2
)](−|xC − xi|+ vC)
over the lottery where A qualifies to the general election
Φ(
xA + vA + xC − vC
2
)(−|xA − xi|+ vA) + [1− Φ(xA + vA + xC − vC
2
)](−|xC − xi|+ vC).
This is so, because as ε→ 0 candidates A and B offer voter i almost the same utility since −|xB − xi|+ vB →
−|xA − xi|+ vA, but the probability of B winning the general election conditional on having won the primary
remains substantially larger than the probability of A winning the general election conditional on having won
the primary. That is, if this voter behaves as if she were pivotal in the primary of the leftist party, she will vote
for candidate B, and not for her favorite candidate, A. If this voter actually votes for her least preferred primary
candidate applying this reasoning, then we say that this voter behaves strategically. We will now argue that the
main features of our equilibrium analysis continue to hold if we add a small measure of strategic voters in the
primary electorates.
Let us consider that a share of voters of the leftist primary of size s ∈ [0, 1] are sincere and a share of size
1− s are strategic. For simplicity, we consider that the leftist party holds a closed primary and that the rightist
party nominates directly candidate C without a primary.3 Moreover, we assume that the distributions of ideal
policies of both kinds of primary voters are identical, strictly increasing and continuous; and define ls ∈ [l,m),
such that, the sincere voters with ideal policies to the left of ls are equal to half of the total primary electorate of
3Our arguments directly extend to the case in which both parties hold primaries.
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the leftist party. Naturally, ls need not exist when s is small, but it is guaranteed to exist when s is sufficiently
close to one (we have that ls → l when s→ 1). We will argue that if xA = ls and xB = ls + vB − vA; and s is
sufficiently close to one, then no candidate has any incentives to change her platform. That is, we will argue that
introduction of a small share of strategic voters moves candidates to more central policies but does not upset
the general structure of our equilibrium.
Indeed, candidate B wins the primary in the posited profile, and has no incentives to move: a) to the left
since this will decrease her election probability in the general election (even if she still wins the primary), and
b) to the right since, by doing that, A will be preferred by enough sincere voters to secure a majority and win
the primary election. Similarly, A has no incentives to deviate: a) to the right as B will be preferred by enough
sincere voters to secure B a majority and win the primary election,4 and b) to the left, because if the deviation
is small no strategic voter will vote for A and hence the sincere votes in favor of A will not be enough to win
her the primary; and if the deviation is large, even if strategic voters vote for her, the measure of sincere voters
that will vote for B will be enough to secure B a majority. To see why the latter is true consider that A deviates
to x′A < ls and compute the expected utilities of a strategic voter with ideal policy equal to x′A conditional on A
winning the primary and conditional on B winning the primary.5 If A wins the primary, the voter expects
Φ(
x′A + vA + xC − vC
2
)vA + [1− Φ(x
′
A + vA + xC − vC
2
)](−|xC − x′A|+ vC) (1)
and if B wins the primary, the voter expects
Φ(
xB + vB + xC − vC
2
)(−|xB − x′A|+ vB) + [1− Φ(
xB + vB + xC − vC
2
)](−|xC − x′A|+ vC). (2)
Clearly, the incentives for the strategic voter with an ideology identical to the one proposed by A to vote for







) since xB > xA and vB > vA). It is easy to see that if the deviation is “small”, (2) is strictly
4Recall that xB = ls+vB−vA. Therefore as long asA deviates to any location x′A ∈ (ls, xB +vB−vA = ls+2(vB−vA)) with
ls + 2(vB − vA) ≤ 1 all sincere voters will vote for B and hence B will win the majority in the primary. All sincere voters will vote
forB also if ls+2(vB−vA) > 1 since no deviation to the right of ls makes a sincere voter vote forA. Finally, if ls+2(vB−vA) ≤ 1
and A deviates to x′A ∈ [ls + 2(vB − vA), 1] again B will be winning the primary. This is the case because B will be preferred by at
least all sincere voters with ideal policies in [0, ls + 2(vB − vA)), who constitute a clear majority.
5Notice that if a strategic voter with such preferences (i.e., voters’ ideal point coincides with A’s proposal) does not vote for A
then no strategic voter does.
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larger than (1) and hence the strategic voter will vote forB not making the deviation profitable (this is true when
x′A is smaller but sufficiently close to xB − vB + vA, for any xB > vB − vA). For the deviation to make the
strategic voter to vote for A and that (1) to be larger than (2) it must be that x′A is small and far enough from
xB−vB +vA. So if the share of strategic voters is sufficiently small (that is, s→ 1 and ls = xB−vB +vA → l)
we have that a strategic voter might vote forA only if x′A is substantially smaller than l. But even in that case such
deviation was not profitable fro A since the sincere voters that will vote for B will constitute a clear majority.
As we argued, strategic voting in primaries between candidates of different valences generates interesting
dynamics promoting more moderate policies. But, perhaps more importantly, we have established that as long
as sincere voting is the predominant voting behavior, the main features of the primaries’ equilibrium analysis
that we have conducted in the sincere voting environment continue to hold.
1.3 Robustness
Spatial models of electoral competition are known to provide different predictions depending on a number of
factors including:6 a) the number of competing candidates, b) candidates’ objectives, c) voters’ utility functions,
d) the number of policy issues, e) the presence or not of valence differences, and f) whether the analysis focuses
exclusively on pure strategies or permits the use of mixed ones. In the standard Downsian framework (two
office motivated candidates and a unique policy issue), for instance, if one increases the policy issues form one
to two, a pure strategy equilibrium rarely exists (Plott, 1967) and if one increases the candidates from two to
three, then: a) when candidates are vote-share motivated, a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist (Shaked,
1982); while b) when candidates are winmotivated, pure strategy equilibria exist –only in asymmetric strategies,
though. Similarly if one adds valence asymmetries between the two candidates, pure strategy equilibria cease
to exist (Aragonès and Palfrey, 2002) and the shape of voter’s utility functions also drives candidates closer
or farther apart (Kamada and Kojima, 2014). Notice that all the described changes in the model’s predictions
are substantial and not “technically” driven. They continue to hold even if we allow candidates to use ε-best
responses (e.g., Palfrey 1984) or if we consider discrete policy spaces (e.g., Aragonès and Palfrey 2002) given
that the continuity of the policy space might make a candidate not have a well defined best response function.7
6See Grofman (2004) for a summary of possible extensions of the original Downsian model.
7This is true even in the original unidimensional Downsian model with two vote-share maximizing candidates: unless the second
candidate is located at the median voter’s ideal policy, the first player has no well-defined best response!
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Fortunately, the main implications of our primaries’ analysis seem to be particularly resilient to a number
of changes in the assumptions. Importantly, one can consider a multidimensional policy space and/or concave
utility functions and expect similar dynamics to the ones presented in our model. Indeed, Ansolabehere and
Snyder (2000) show that when two candidates of different valence compete in a multidimensional policy space
and voters’ have Euclidian preferences over policies then –if the valence difference is substantial but not neces-
sarily extremely large– there exists a set of policy platforms that secure her election. In other words, if primaries
are held in such a multidimensional environment, the high valence candidate can choose the primary winner
location that will give her the largest probability of winning the general election –precisely as she does in our
unidimensional setup. Similarly, for concave utility functions a set of winner locations for the high valence can-
didate in each primary election is guaranteed to exist and each of the high valence candidates will locate there
trying to approach the other as much as possible.8 Of course, in many variants of our original model with gener-
alized policy spaces and voters’ loss functions, it might be the case that the set of winner locations is not closed,
and hence that best responses are not well defined. We stress though that such issues are only of technical nature
and can be effectively dealt with by considering either ε-best responses (e.g., Palfrey 1984) or discrete policy
spaces (e.g., Aragonès and Palfrey 2002). Indeed, if the sets of winner locations for the high valence candidates
of the two parties are sufficiently apart, the only reasonable thing to expect is that high valence candidates will
locate within this set and as “close” as possible to the set of winner locations of the other party. Naturally, these
dynamics may collapse if these sets are close to each other and/or when valence differences between primary
candidates are not very large. These arguments, though, strongly suggest that primaries are not a stabilizing
force only in the context of the unidimensional model, and that their appeal is quite wider.
Also, if one attempts to consider alternative objective functions one is lead to similar conclusions. If, for
example, candidates lexicographically maximize, first, the probability of winning the general election and, then,
their primary vote share, it is evident that the low valence candidates will have incentives to marginally deviate
–from their posited strategy in the closed primaries’ equilibrium– towards the extremes to increase their primary
vote share (since the probability that they will win the general election is zero). But if we consider, for example,
a discrete policy space –composed of any number of policy alternatives– the resulting equilibrium profile will
8In the presence of valence asymmetries, convex utility functions might generate disconnected sets of supporters for a given
candidate (e.g. both leftist and rightist extremists might prefer the first candidate, while moderate voters might prefer the second
candidate). This would generate substantial changes in the incentive structure of electoral competition and is never the case with
concave utilities.
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be essentially identical to the one that we have characterized: the high valence primary candidate will locate to
the most moderate location that guarantees that the median of her party will vote for her, and the low valence
primary candidate of the leftist (rightist) party will propose the policy alternative that is to the left (right) of her
party’s median voter. Hence, despite the fact that providing formal results for all reasonable variations of the
model is beyond the scope of the current analysis, we find strong indications that the substantial implications of
the analysis qualify to alternative and more general settings.
Finally, even if one allows for mixed strategies it turns out that our unique pure strategy equilibrium de-
scribes, to all effects, the only reasonable outcome of the game.9 Indeed, while mixed equilibria exist, they all
involve the two high valence candidates selecting the pure strategy of the unique pure strategy equilibrium and
the two low quality candidates using mixed strategies that assign sufficiently large probability to the ideal policy
of their parties’ medians. That is, outcome wise, they are equivalent: the winners of the primary elections and
of the general election are unchanged. This is so because, as long as the low valence candidates locate at the
pure strategy equilibrium location with large enough probability, the high valence candidates opt for the pure
strategy equilibrium location. The reason why there are no “interesting” mixed equilibria (that is, equilibria in
which the high valence candidates mix too) is the following: If a high valence candidate mixes in an equilibrium,
the support of her mixed strategy should include only undominated policies, and this should rule out policies
more extreme than her platform in the unique pure strategy equilibrium. Moreover, if a high valence candidate
plays more moderate policies than her strategy in the unique pure equilibrium with positive probability, the
equilibrium payoff of the low valence candidate of her party should be strictly positive (because otherwise she
could deviate to the party median and secure a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election), and
this suggests that the support of the mixed strategy of a low valence candidate cannot contain policies more
extreme than the ideal policy of her party’s median voter. Notice though that when the high valence candidate,
e.g., B, finds herself located at the most moderate point of her mixed strategy’s support, say x′′ > l, then: a)
in case the low valence candidate locates at x′′ − vB + vA or to its right (assume this happens with probability
p > 0), B wins the primary election; and b) in case the low valence candidate does not locate at x′′ − vB + vA
or to its right, the payoff of B is zero. But since A has never an incentive to locate at x′′ − vB + vA or to its
right because she gets a payoff zero for all possible realizations of B’s mixed strategy, it must be the case that
9The arguments regarding mixed strategy equilibria apply also to the main interpretation of our model presented in the manuscript
where candidates maximize their general election vote share in the absence of any kind of uncertainty regarding the location of the
median voter.
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p = 0. This leads to the paradox of B receiving a zero payoff when the realization of her mixed strategy is the
most moderate policy in its support. Hence, there is no equilibrium in which a high valence candidate places
any positive probability to any policy other than the one used in the unique pure equilibrium of the game.
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2 Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1. This is a four-player, asymmetric and discontinuous game and hence not only there
is no standardized way to characterize a unique equilibrium but even existence of an equilibrium is not trivially
guaranteed. We will establish our result first by characterizing properties of an equilibrium and identifying a
unique strategy profile that satisfies all of them (Step 1: Characterization and uniqueness of an equilibrium). We
will argue that this strategy profile is indeed a Nash equilibrium (Step 2: Existence of an equilibrium). Recall
that for the case of closed primaries the result is stated for valence differences not being very large, that is vB is
such that l < m− vB < m+ vB < r.
Step 1 In this part of the proof we establish a number of properties that a Nash equilibrium, xˆ, should satisfy,
employing a series of Lemmas. All statements are presented assuming the existence of at least one equilibrium.
Lemma 1: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, B gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, B gets an expected vote share equal to zero in the general
election. Then, if B deviates to xB = l, she wins her party’s primary with certainty. This is so because: a)
vB > vA and b) for every xA > l − vB + vA it is true that ui(xA, vA) < ui(l, vB) for every i < l + vB − vA
and for every xA < l + vB − vA it is true that ui(xA, vA) < ui(l, vB) for every i > l − vB + vA. That
is, for every xA ∈ [0,m] a majority of the primary voters of the leftist party votes for B. Moreover, since
vB > max{vA, vC , vD},B is voted in the general election at least by all voters with an ideal policy in (l−ε, l+ε)
for some ε > 0. That is, her general election vote share is at least equal to Φ(l+ ε)−Φ(l− ε), which is strictly
positive by the fact that Φ is strictly increasing. In other words, B has incentives to deviate from the posited
strategy and, hence, a strategy profile such that B gets an expected vote share equal to zero in the general
election, cannot be an equilibrium. 
Lemma 2: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, B wins the primary of the leftist party with certainty.
Proof: Since by Lemma 1 in anyNash equilibriumB gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general
election, it must be the case that B advances to the general election with a strictly positive probability. Given
that candidates are allowed to use only pure strategies, there are two cases: either B advances to the general
election with certainty or with probability 1
2
. Candidate B advances to the general election with probability 1
2
if and only if she receives exactly the same share of votes in the primaries of the leftist party as A. This may
happen if and only if |xA− xB| > vB − vA and either xA+vA+xB−vB2 = l or xA−vA+xB+vB2 = l. In both cases the
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candidate located to the left of l expects a positive vote share conditional on qualifying to the general election
(by the fact that valence differences are not very large) and can deviate marginally towards l, securing a sure
win in the primaries and practically doubling her expected general election vote share. Hence, it cannot be that
in equilibrium B advances to the general election with any probability smaller than 1. 
The proof of the next lemma is similar to the proof of Lemma 1 –but not precisely identical. To make the
proof as easy to follow as possible, we preferred to provide the whole line of reasoning in its support (which is,
to a great extent, a repetition of the arguments in the proof of Lemma 1), rather than to just point out where one
should make the minor modifications.
Lemma 3: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, C gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, C gets a zero expected vote share in the general election. Then,
if C deviates to xC = r, she wins her party’s primary with certainty. This is so because: a) vC > vD and b)
for every xD > r − vC + vD it is true that ui(xD, vD) < ui(r, vC) for every i < r + vC − vD and for every
xD < r+vC−vD it is true that ui(xD, vD) < ui(r, vC) for every i > r−vC +vD. That is, for every xD ∈ [m, 1]
a majority of the primary voters of the rightist party votes for C. Moreover, since valence differences are not
very large, C is voted in the general election at least by all voters with an ideal policy in (r− ε, r+ ε) for some
ε > 0. That is, her general election vote share is at least equal to Φ(r+ ε)−Φ(r− ε), which is strictly positive
by the fact that Φ is strictly increasing. In other words, C has incentives to deviate from the posited strategy and,
hence, a strategy profile such that C gets an expected vote share equal to zero in the general election, cannot be
an equilibrium. 
The arguments supporting Lemma 4 are symmetric to the ones supporting Lemma 2 and are, hence, skipped.
Lemma 4: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, C wins the primary of the rightist party with certainty.
Lemma 5: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = xˆB − vB + vA.
Proof: Consider first that, in equilibrium, xˆA < xˆB − vB + vA. Since by Lemma 2 it is the case that B wins
with certainty the leftist party’s primaries, it should be the case that xˆA+vA+xˆB−vB
2
< l. By Lemmas 3 and 4 we
know that C advances to the general election with certainty and that she receives there a strictly positive vote
share. Hence, there exists ε > 0 such that ifB deviates to xˆB +ε it will still be the case that xˆA+vA+xˆB+ε−vB2 < l
(B wins the leftist party’s primary with certainty) and moreover B will secure a strictly positive increase in her
general election vote share.10 So in equilibrium it cannot be the case that xˆA < xˆB − vB + vA. Now consider
10Since in any equilibrium, xˆ, C qualifies to the general election with certainty (Lemma 4) and expects a positive general election
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that, in equilibrium, xˆA > xˆB−vB +vA. If xˆA > xˆB +vB−vA then, given thatB wins with certainty the leftist
party’s primaries (by Lemma 2), it should be the case that xˆA−vA+xˆB+vB
2
> l. Again, there exists ε > 0 such
that if B deviates to xˆB + ε it will still be the case that xˆA−vA+xˆB+ε+vB2 > l (B wins the leftist party’s primaries
with certainty) and moreover B will secure a strictly positive increase in her general election vote share. So in
equilibrium it cannot be the case that xˆA > xˆB − vB + vA either. 
Lemma 6: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = l.
Proof: Consider first that xˆA < l. Then by Lemma 5 it follows that xˆB = xˆA + vB − vA < l + vB − vA.
This suggests that there exists ε > 0 such that ifB deviates to xˆB +ε it will be the case that xˆA+vA+xˆB+ε−vB2 < l
(B wins the leftist party’s primary with certainty) and moreover B will secure a strictly positive increase in her
general election vote share (applying the same reasoning as footnote 10). Hence, in equilibrium, it cannot be
that xˆA < l. Now consider that xˆA > l. By Lemma 5 it follows that xˆB = xˆA + vB − vA > l + vB − vA. This
suggests that A can deviate to xˆA = l, win her party’s primary with certainty and secure a strictly positive vote
share in the general election (by the fact that valence differences are not very large). Hence, in equilibrium, it
cannot be that xˆA > l either. 
Lemma 7: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆB = l + vB − vA.
Proof: This is a trivial implication of Lemmas 5 and 6. 
Lemma 8: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆC = r − vC + vD and xˆD = r.
Proof: Consider a Nash equilibrium, xˆ. Since: a) by Lemma 4, C wins with certainty the primary of the
rightist party, b) by Lemmas 6 and 7 xˆA = l and xˆB = l + vB − vA, and c) valence differences are not very
large; it must be the case that xˆC ∈ [r − vC + vD, r + vC − vD], because when C makes such a choice, D
does not qualify to the general election with a positive probability for any xD ∈ [m, 1]. Otherwise –that is, if
xˆC /∈ [r − vC + vD, r + vC − vD]– D could locate at r, win the primary of the rightist party with certainty
and secure a positive vote share in the general election. Moreover, by the fact that xˆB < m and that valence
differences are not very large, the general election vote share of C, conditional on C qualifying to the general
election, is strictly decreasing on [r − vC + vD, r + vC − vD]. Hence, in any equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case
that xˆC = r − vC + vD. Finally, if in equilibrium xˆC = r − vC + vD and xˆD 6= r, then C can deviate to
xˆC = r− vC + vD − ε for some ε > 0, and thus, qualify to the general election with certainty and increase her
vote share (Lemma 3), we must have either xˆB + vB − vC < xˆC or xˆB + vB − vC = xˆC . In both cases a marginal move of B
towards the right induces an increase in her general election vote share: in the first case, only a marginal increase, and in the latter a
substantial one.
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general election vote share (since xˆB < m and valence differences are not very large). So, if in equilibrium we
have xˆC = r − vC + vD, we should also have xˆD = r. 
Hence, by Lemmas 6, 7 and 8, it follows that there exists a unique strategy profile that is a candidate for an
equilibrium in our game; xˆ = (l, l + vB − vA, r − vC + vD, r).
Step 2 In this part of the proof we have to show that no candidate has incentives to deviate from xˆ =
(l, l + vB − vA, r − vC + vD, r). First of all, note that for this profile, in each primary the party’s median
voter is indifferent between the high and low valence candidate. This is also true for all more extreme voters
than the median that split their support between the two primary candidates equally. All more more moderate
voters than each party’s median strictly prefer the high valence candidate over the low valence candidate and
hence candidates B and C are the ones competing in the general election. Given that valence differences are
not very large, in this strategy profile vote shares in the general election are hence PA(xˆA, xˆ−A : v,Φ, l, r) =
PD(xˆD, xˆ−D : v,Φ, l, r) = 0 and PB(xˆB, xˆ−B : v,Φ, l, r) = 1− PC(xˆC , xˆ−C : v,Φ, l, r) = Φ( xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC2 ).
CandidateAwill have incentives to deviate if there exists x´A ∈ [0,m] such that PA(x´A, xˆ−A : v,Φ, l, r) > 0.
But if A deviates to x´A < l then x´A+vA+xˆB−vB2 < l (B wins the primary of the leftist party with certainty)
and hence PA(x´A, xˆ−A : v,Φ, l, r) = 0. If A deviates to x´A > l then at least all voters with ideal policies
in [0, l + vB − vA) will vote for candidate B in the primary of the leftist party and, hence, B will win the
primary of the leftist party with certainty, inducing PA(x´A, xˆ−A : v,Φ, l, r) = 0. Therefore, candidate A has no
incentives to deviate away from xˆA = l. Similar arguments rule out incentives for deviation away from xˆD = r
for candidate D.
If candidate B deviates to x´B < l + vB − vA then, even if she wins in the primary of the leftist party, she
gets a vote share of Φ( x´B+vB+xˆC−vC
2
) that is strictly smaller than Φ( xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC
2
). That is, her payoff is strictly
smaller than PB(xˆB, xˆ−B : v,Φ, l, r). If candidate B deviates to x´B > l+ vB − vA then xˆA+vA+x´B−vB2 > l and
hence A wins the primary of the leftist party with certainty. That is, PB(x´B, xˆ−B : v,Φ, l, r) = 0. Therefore,
candidate B has no incentives to deviate from xˆB = l + vB − vA. Similar arguments rule out incentives for
deviation away from xˆC = r − vC + vD for candidate C.





⇐⇒ l + 2vB − vA + r − 2vC + vD > 2m, C is the winner if Φ( xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC2 ) < 12 ⇐⇒ l + 2vB − vA +
r − 2vC + vD < 2m and each of these candidates wins with probability 12 if Φ( xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC2 ) = 12 ⇐⇒
13
l + 2vB − vA + r − 2vC + vD = 2m.
Proof of Proposition 2. As in the Proof of Proposition 1 in Step 1 we identify a unique strategy profile
that satisfies the equilibrium properties and then show in Step 2 that this profile is indeed an equilibrium. The
proof is similar to Proposition 1, however further arguments are needed since by permitting open primaries each
deviation implies a change in the primary electorates. Recall that in this case valence differences not being very
large means that vB ∈ (0, v˜B) for some v˜B > 0.
Step 1 Additional to similar arguments as in the case of closed primaries we now start the proof by showing
the existence of a unique pair (l∗, r∗) ∈ (0, 1)2. Again, in this Step all statements are presented assuming the
existence of at least one equilibrium.
Lemma 9: For every log-concave, F , there exists v˜B > 0 such that for every vB ∈ (0, v˜B) a unique pair










); and c) l∗ < ma − 2vB < ma + 2vB < r∗.
Proof: Since ma ∈ (0, 1) there exists v´B > 0 such that for every vB ∈ (0, v´B) we have 0 < ma − 2vB <
ma + 2vB < 1. Consider that vB ∈ (0, v´B) and let q ∈ [0, 1] and (l¯, r¯) ∈ [0, 1]2 be such that 2F (l¯) = F (q)
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= q. That is, there exists a unique pair (l∗, r∗) ∈ (0, 1)2 for which













) ∈ (0,ma). Hence, by continuity of (l∗, r∗) ∈ (0, 1)2 in candidates’ quality parameters
–as long as vB ∈ (0, v´B)– it follows that there exists v˜B > 0 such that for every vB ∈ (0, v˜B) we have l∗ <
ma − 2vB < ma + 2vB < r∗. 
Lemma 10: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ,B gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, B gets an expected vote share equal to zero in the general
election. Then, if B deviates to xB = xˆA, and given that vB > max{vA, vC , vD} she wins her party’s primary
with certainty and is voted in the general election at least by all voters with an ideal policy in [xˆA, xˆA + ε) for
11This is implied by the fact thatma − 2vB > 0, vB > vA > 0, vC > vD > 0 and vB > vC .
12This is implied by the fact thatma + 2vB < 1, vB > vA > 0, vC > vD > 0 and vB > vC .
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some ε > 0. 
Lemma 11: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆB > xˆA.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, xˆB ≤ xˆA. If xˆB ≤ xˆA are such that A wins the primary with
certainty then it must be the case that xˆB < xˆA and B has incentives to deviate to xˆA that guarantees a primary
victory for B and a positive expected vote share in the general election (Lemma 10). If xˆB ≤ xˆA are such that
B wins the primary with certainty and xˆD < xˆB + vB − vD and xˆC < xˆB + vB − vC then for example C can
deviate to xC = 1 and increase her general election vote share. If at least one of xˆD < xˆB + vB − vD and
xˆC < xˆB + vB − vC is violated then a deviation by B to xˆB + ε for some ε > 0 guarantees a primary victory
for B and an increase in the expected vote share in the general election. If xˆB ≤ xˆA are such that A and B tie
in the primary then it must be the case that xˆB < xˆA and a deviation by B to xˆB + ε for some ε > 0 guarantees
a primary victory for B, without reducing her general election vote share, therefore practically doubling her
expected vote share in the general election. Hence there exists no equilibrium where xˆB ≤ xˆA. 
Lemma 12: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, B wins the primary of the leftist party with certainty.
Proof: Since in any Nash equilibrium,B gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election, it
must be the case thatB advances to the general election with a strictly positive probability. Given that candidates
are allowed to use only pure strategies, there are two cases: either B advances to the general election with
certainty or with probability 1
2
. Candidate B advances to the general election with probability 1
2
if and only if
she receives exactly the same share of votes in the primaries of the leftist party as A. Given that from Lemma
11 in equilibrium xˆB > xˆA and the fact that A and B tie this may happen if and only if xˆB > xˆA + vB − vA.13
Then there exists ε > 0 such that A deviates to xˆA + ε hence wins the primary with certainty and marginally
increases her general election vote share.14 Hence, it cannot be that in equilibrium B advances to the general
election with any probability smaller than 1. 
Lemma 13: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆD > xˆB + vB − vD.
Proof: First, assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, xˆD < xˆB + vB − vD and one of the following three holds:
13This is true because if xˆA < xˆB ≤ xˆA + vB − vA the only way that A and B can tie is if no voters participate in the primary
of the leftist party which never occurs given that vB > vC . Given that a positive measure of voters participates in the leftist primary
then no tie can be sustained: If xˆA < xˆB < xˆA + vB − vA all voters participating in the primary of the leftist party support B. If
xˆA < xˆB = xˆA + vB − vA again B qualifies with certainty since all voters to the left of xˆA that participate in the leftist primary are
indifferent between A and B and split their vote while all voters on the right of xˆA that participate in the leftist primary vote for B.
14Notice that for A’s general election vote share to increase it is sufficient that xˆJ ≥ xˆA + ε+ vJ − vA for any J = C,D which is
always true given that xˆB > xˆA + vB − vA and xˆJ > xˆB and vB > vJ for any J = C,D.
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1. xˆC < xˆB + vB − vC : No voters participate in the open primary of the rightist party and hence each of
C andD qualify to the general election with probability 1/2. However, C gets a zero expected vote share
in the general election and hence has incentives to deviate for instance to xˆB + vB − vC guaranteeing a
primary victory and a positive expected vote share in the general election. Notice that this deviation is
always feasible since by Lemma 9 we have thatma + 2vB < 1 and hencema + vB − vC < 1.
2. xˆC = xˆB +vB−vC : All voters participating in the open primary of the rightist party support candidateC
and therefore C surely qualifies to the general election. In the general election all voters to the left of xˆC
vote forB and all voters to the right of xˆC voteB or C with equal probability. Hence, C has incentives to
the deviate to xˆC + ε for some ε > 0 still guaranteeing a primary victory (D is still not voted by anyone
in the primary) and practically doubling her general election vote share.
3. xˆC > xˆB + vB − vC : All voters participating in the open primary of the rightist party support candidate
C and therefore C surely qualifies to the general election where she is encountering candidateB (Lemma
12). In the general election and since xˆC > xˆB + vB− vC , C is expecting a positive vote share. However,
a deviation by C to xˆC − ε for some ε > 0 is profitable since it still guarantees a primary victory and an
increased vote share in the general election.
Hence, in equilibrium it can not be that xˆ, xˆD > xˆB + vB − vD.
Second, assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, xˆD = xˆB + vB − vD and one of the following three holds:
4. xˆC < xˆB + vB − vC : C does not get any votes in the primary and hence expects a zero vote share in the
general election. A deviation of C to xˆD guarantees a primary victory and a positive vote share.
5. xˆC = xˆB + vB − vC : Combining the fact that xˆD = xˆB + vB − vD and xˆC = xˆB + vB − vC we are in
a situation where also xˆD = xˆC + vC − vD. In that instance xˆA < xˆB < xˆC < xˆD with all voters on
the right of xˆD being indifferent among B,C and D. Given that by Lemma 11 xˆA < xˆB and vA < vB it
can never be the case that all voters prefer A over B (and hence C andD) and therefor a positive measure
of voters participates in the primary of the rightist party. That is, two thirds on the right of xˆD (that are
indifferent between C and D) and half of those between xˆC and xˆD (that prefer C over D) participate in
the rightist primary. Therefor, candidate C wins the primary with certainty. Conditional on C qualifying
to the general election, all general election voters on the right of xˆC are indifferent between B and C
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and therefore half of these voters constitute C’s general election vote share. Hence, C has incentives to
deviate to xˆC + ε for some ε > 0 guaranteeing a) a sure primary victory, and b) a larger vote share in
the general election. Points a) and b) together imply an increase in C’s expected vote share in the general
election and hence incentives to deviate.
6. xˆC > xˆB + vB − vC : If xˆC and xˆD are such that C wins the primary of the rightist party or C and D tie
then a a deviation by C to xˆC−ε for some ε > 0 is profitable since it guarantees a primary victory and an
increased vote share in the general election. If xˆC and xˆD are such thatD wins the primary of the rightist
party then a a deviation by C to xˆD = xˆB + vB − vD guarantees a primary victory for C and a positive
expected vote share in the general election.
Hence, in equilibrium it can not be that xˆ, xˆD = xˆB + vB − vD. Combined with the fact that xˆD >
xˆB+vB−vD can not be part of an equilibrium either we have shown that in equilibrium xˆD < xˆB+vB−vD.

Lemma 14: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆC < xˆD.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, xˆC = xˆD. Then given that in equilibrium by Lemma 13
xˆD > xˆB + vB − vD some voters participate in the rightist primary that is won by C with certainty. Notice that
xˆD > xˆB + vB − vD also implies that C expects a positive vote share in the general election. C however has
incentives to deviate to xˆC − ε for some ε > 0 still winning the primary with certainty but also increasing her
expected general election vote share. Hence it can never hold that xˆC = xˆD.
Assume now that in some equilibrium, xˆ, xˆC > xˆD. Recall that by Lemma 13 xˆD > xˆB + vB − vD. Hence,
if C loses the primary election a deviation to xˆD guarantees a victory in the rightist primary and a positive
expected vote share in the general election. If C wins the primary election or there is a tie between C and D
again deviation to xˆD guarantees a primary victory and an increase in C’s expected vote share in the general
election. Hence it can never hold that xˆC > xˆD either implying that in equilibrium xˆC < xˆD. 
Lemma 15: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, C gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, C gets a zero expected vote share in the general election.
Since B competes in the general election with certainty, and xB ≤ xC , C obtains a zero expected vote share if
xˆC < xˆB + vB − vC . But this can not be an equilibrium since C has incentives to deviate. As we have shown
in Lemma 13 in equilibrium xˆD > xˆB + vB − vD. Hence, a deviation of C to xC = xˆD guarantees a win in the
17
rightist primary and a positive expected expected vote share in the general election. 
Lemma 16: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, xˆC > xˆB + vB − vC .
Proof: Notice that by Lemma 15 it follows that xˆC ≥ xˆB +vB−vC . Hence to show that xˆC > xˆB +vB−vC
we need to prove that xˆC = xˆB + vB − vC can never be part of an equilibrium. Assume that in equilibrium
xˆC = xˆB + vB − vC . Then all voters on the right of xˆC are indifferent between B and C. Hence, if C were to
qualify on the general election its vote share would be equal to half of the voters on the right of B. Whether C
qualifies to the general election depends on xˆC and xˆD. If xˆC and xˆD are such thatD qualifies with certainty to
the general election then xˆD > xˆC +vC−vD.15 In that case, C has incentives to deviate to xˆD and qualify to the
general election and obtain a positive expected vote share. If xˆC and xˆD are such that C qualifies with certainty
then C has incentives to deviate to xˆC + ε for some ε > 0 still winning the primary and almost doubling her
expected general election vote share. Finally, if xˆC and xˆD are such that C qualifies with probability 1/2 then
xˆD > xˆC + vC − vD. In that case, the voters that participate in the primary of the rightist party are half of those
between xˆC and xˆC+vC+xD−vD2 (and all of them prefer C over D) and all voters on the right of
xˆC+vC+xD−vD
2
(and all of them prefer D over C). Then D has incentives to deviate to xˆD − ε for some ε > 0 securing a
primary victory while increasing her general election vote share. Hence, xˆC = xˆB + vB − vC can not be part
of an equilibrium proving that xˆC > xˆB + vB − vC . 
Lemma 17: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, C wins the primary of the rightist party with certainty.
Proof: Given that by Lemmas 11 and 14, xB > xA, xC < xD, B qualifies with certainty to the primary
and C gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election the arguments proving this Lemma are
symmetric to the ones of Lemma 12. 
Lemma 18: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = xˆB − vB + vA.
Proof: Consider first that, in equilibrium, xˆA < xˆB − vB + vA. Since by Lemma 12 B wins with certainty
the leftist party’s primaries, it should be the case that xˆA+vA+xˆB−vB
2
< l˜. By Lemmas 17 and 16 we know that C
advances to the general election with certainty and that she receives there a strictly positive vote share. Hence,
there exists ε > 0 such that if B deviates to xˆB + ε it will still be the case that xˆA+vA+xˆB+ε−vB2 < l˜ (B wins
the leftist party’s primary with certainty) and moreover B will secure a strictly positive increase in her general
15ForD to qualify with certainty there must be a positive measure of voters participating in the rightist primary (otherwise each of
C andD qualify with equal probability). Notice that if xˆC < xˆD < xˆC + vC − vD thenD never qualifies to the general election with
certainty since all primary voters vote for C. If xˆC < xˆD = xˆC + vC − vD we are in situation 5 of Lemma 13 where C qualifies to
the general election with certainty and hence again D can not qualify with certainty.
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election vote share. So in equilibrium it cannot be the case that xˆA < xˆB − vB + vA. Now consider that, in
equilibrium, xˆA > xˆB − vB + vA. Notice that in the primary of the leftist party A obtains zero votes and all
primary voters (non-empty set given that vB is the highest valence candidate) vote for candidate B. Hence,
there exists ε > 0 such that if B deviates to xˆB + ε it will still win the primary election with certainty while
also increasing her general election vote share. So in equilibrium it cannot be the case that xˆA > xˆB − vB + vA
either. 
By Lemmas 14, 16 and 18 it follows that in equilibrium only a voter with ideology xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC
2
is indif-
ferent between participating in the leftist primary and the rightist one: all voters with an ideal policy to his
left constitute the leftist primary electorate and all voters to his right constitute the rightist primary electorate.
Hence, we can define the median of the leftist party as l˜ being the unique solution to 2F (l˜) = F ( xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC
2
)
and the median of the rightist party as r˜ being the unique solution to 2[1− F (r˜)] = 1− F ( xˆB+vB+xˆC−vC
2
).
Lemma 19: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = l˜
Proof: Consider first that xˆA < l˜. Then by Lemma 18 it follows that xˆB = xˆA + vB − vA < l˜ + vB − vA.
This suggests that there exists ε > 0 such that ifB deviates to xˆB +ε it will be the case that xˆA+vA+xˆB+ε−vB2 < l˜
(B wins the leftist party’s primary with certainty) and moreover B will secure a strictly positive increase in her
general election vote share (Lemmas 13 and 16). Hence, in equilibrium, it cannot be that xˆA < l˜. Now consider
that xˆA > l˜. By Lemma 18 it follows that xˆB = xˆA + vB − vA > l˜+ vB − vA. This suggests that A can deviate
to xˆA = l˜, win her party’s primary with certainty and secure a strictly positive vote share in the general election.
Hence, in equilibrium, it cannot be that xˆA > l˜ either. 
Lemma 20: In equilibrium, xˆA = l∗, xˆB = l∗ + vB − vA, xˆC = r∗ − vC + vD and xˆD = r∗.
Proof: Given that in equilibrium xˆA = l˜ and xˆA = l˜+vB−vA (Lemmas 18 and 19) and thatC qualifies to the
general election with certainty (Lemma 17), it must be the case that the expected payoff ofD is zero. Moreover,
since xˆC < xˆD (by Lemma 14), xˆC must belong to [r˜−vC+vD, r˜+vC−vD], otherwise: a) if xˆC < r˜−vC+vD,
D could deviate to xˆC + vC − vD +  for some  > 0, qualify to the general election with certainty and strictly
increase his expected payoff; and b) if xˆC > r˜+ vC − vD,D could deviate to xˆC − vC + vD−  for some  > 0,
qualify to the general election with certainty and strictly increase his expected payoff. Notice that for valence
differences that are not very large, l˜ is always substantially smaller than ma and hence l˜ + vB − vC < ma and
ma − vC + vD < r˜. Finally, for xˆC < xˆD, r˜ and C’s general election vote share (conditional on qualifying
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to the general election) increases continuously as C moves smoothly from xˆC to ma, so the only candidate for
xˆC = r˜− vC + vD. From this it follows that the unique candidate for xˆD = r˜ (otherwise there exists  > 0 such
thatC increases her expected payoff by deviating to r˜−vC +vD+). If xˆB = l˜+vB−vA and xˆC = r˜−vC +vD




, and hence l˜ = l∗ and r˜ = r∗.

Step 2 Finally, we argue that any unilateral deviation from the posited profile is unprofitable. Given that
this profile is such that A andD locate exactly at the median of their party andB and C as close to the society’s
median voter as possible (that is, as long as they win the primaries with certainty), nobody has an incentive
to deviate to a more extreme policy. But deviations towards more moderate policies cannot be trivially ruled
out. Assume that candidate B deviates towards the centre. Then, indeed she looses primary votes from the left
but she gains primary votes from the right. For this deviation to be unprofitable we need that the gain from the
right is smaller when compared to the loss from the left. Consider that B deviates to x′B ∈ (l∗ + vB − vA,ma].
Since for valence differences not very large it is the case that ma + 2vB < r∗, it follows that the primary






































< 0 for every x′B ∈ (l∗ + vB − vA,ma] due to log-
concavity of F . In other words, if B deviates to any x′B ∈ (l∗ + vB − vA,ma], she loses from A in the primary
and gets a payoff equal to zero. Similarly, one can show that A has no profitable deviations to the left of the
posited strategy. The arguments that prove that C and D have no incentives to change policy platforms are
symmetric.
Proof of Proposition 3.
This Proof is similar to the one of Proposition 1. Given that a primary election takes place only in the leftist
party andC competes in the general election for sure some supporting arguments need some small modifications.
Lemma 21: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ,B gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: The arguments needed to prove this Lemma are similar to the ones proving Lemma 1. If in equilib-
riumB gets an expected vote share equal to zero in the general election,B can deviate to xB = l and for the same
arguments as in Lemma 1 win her her party’s primary with certainty. However, given that vB > max{vA, vC}
need not be true any longer, to show that for this deviation B gets a positive general election vote share where
she competes against C, it is sufficient to show that xB = l ≤ xC + vB − vC . The latter always holds when
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valence differences are not very large (i.e.,m+max{vB, vC} < xC). 
Lemma 22: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, B wins the primary of the leftist party with certainty.
Proof: The arguments needed to prove this Lemma are identical to the ones proving Lemma 2. 
Lemma 23: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, C gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: To show that C gets a strictly positive vote share against B in the general election it is sufficient
to have that xC ≥ xˆB + vB − vC . The latter holds given that valence differences are not very large (i.e.,
m+max{vB, vC} < xC) and xˆB ∈ [0,m]. 
Lemma 24: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = xˆB − vB + vA.
Proof: The arguments needed to prove this Lemma are identical to the ones proving Lemma 5 (without the
need to refer to the Lemma showing that C wins the rightist primary given that here C qualifies to the general
election by assumption). 
Lemma 25: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = l.
Proof: The arguments needed to prove this Lemma are identical to the ones proving Lemma 6. 
Hence, by Lemmas 24, and 25, it follows that there exists a unique strategy profile that is a candidate for an
equilibrium in our game; xˆ = (l, l + vB − vA).
The arguments of Step 2 of Proposition 1 proving that neither A nor B have incentives to deviate from the
posited profile apply here as well and prove that xˆ = (l, l + vB − vA) is indeed an equilibrium profile.





⇐⇒ l+2vB−vA+xC−vC > 2m,C is the winner ifΦ( xˆB+vB+xC−vC2 ) < 12 ⇐⇒ l+2vB−vA+xC−vC < 2m






⇐⇒ l+2vB−vA+xC−vC = 2m.
Proof of Proposition 4.
This Proof is similar to the one of Proposition 2.
Lemma 26: For every log-concave,F , there exists vmax > 0 such that for everymax{vB, vC} ∈ (0, vmax): a)
ma+max{vb, vc} < xc, and b) there exists a unique l∗ ∈ (0,ma) such that 2F (l∗) = F ( l∗+vB−vA+xC2 + vB−vC2 ).
Proof: Given the log-concavity of F uniqueness of l∗ is guaranteed. To show that l∗ < ma notice that as









). Notice now that since l∗+xC
2
< 1 it must also be the case that 2F (l∗) < 1 and hence l∗ < ma. 
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Lemma 27: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ,B gets a strictly positive expected vote share in the general election.
Proof: Assume that in some equilibrium, xˆ, B gets an expected vote share equal to zero in the general
election. Then, if B deviates to xB = xˆA, and given that vB > vA she wins her party’s primary with certainty
if a non-empty set of voters participates in the leftist primary. To show that this is the case but also to prove that
B gets a positive general election vote share for this deviation we need to show that xB = xˆA ≤ xC + vB − vC .
The latter always holds when valence differences are not very large (i.e.,m+max{vB, vC} < xC). 
Lemma 28: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆB > xˆA.
Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Lemma 11 (ignoring the arguments referring to candidateD). 
Lemma 29: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, B wins the primary of the leftist party with certainty.
Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Lemma 12. 
Lemma 30: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = xˆB − vB + vA.
Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Lemma 18 with the following minor modifications: a) One does
not need to refer to previous Lemmas to show that C advances to the general election since by assumption C
is the incumbent, and b) to show that there exists a non-empty set of primary voters in the leftist primary the
argument is not any longer that B is the highest valence candidate as in Lemma 12. Now this argument holds
because valence differences are not very large (i.e.,m+max{vB, vC} < xC). 
Lemma 31: In any Nash equilibrium, xˆ, it is the case that xˆA = l∗.
Proof: The proof is identical to the one of Lemma 19 with the following minor modification: One does
not need to refer to previous Lemmas to show that by the studied deviation B will secure a strictly positive
increase in her election vote share. Now this argument holds because valence differences are not very large (i.e.,
m+max{vB, vC} < xC). 
Hence, by Lemmas 30, and 31, it follows that there exists a unique strategy profile that is a candidate for an
equilibrium in our game; xˆ = (l∗, l∗ + vB − vA).
The arguments of Step 2 of Proposition 2 proving that neither A nor B have incentives to deviate from the
posited profile apply here as well and prove that xˆ = (l∗, l∗ + vB − vA) is indeed an equilibrium profile (recall
that here valence difference not very large means thatm+max{vB, vC} < xC).
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